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One Person, One Vote, 435 Seats: Interstate 
Malapportionment and Constitutional Requirements 
JEFFREY W. LADEWIG
Beginning in the 1960s and 1970s, the Supreme Court began to 
establish and enforce a constitutional requirement for the apportionment 
of legislative districts at the national, state, and local levels.  This 
requirement, the “one person, one vote” principle, has become a 
benchmark of the constitutional jurisprudence as well as a 
conceptualization of the fundamental democratic norm of political 
equality.  Since these early cases, apportionment plans that violate  
this constitutional requirementeven with levels of intrastate 
malapportionment of less than 1%have been held to be unconstitutional.  
Yet, there is a much more severe form of malapportionment that continues 
today and will worsen with the reapportionment of the United States House 
of Representatives after the 2010 Census: interstate malapportionment.  
The levels of interstate malapportionment are over 9,000% greater than 
the levels of intrastate malapportionment already found unconstitutional.  
This Article explores the causes and possible solutions to this problem.  It 
concludes that the constitutional requirement of “one person, one vote” 
can only be constitutionally addressedto any considerable degreeby 
reconsidering the twentieth century statutory requirement that fixed the 
size of the House at 435 seats.  
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One Person, One Vote, 435 Seats: Interstate 
Malapportionment and Constitutional Requirements 
 
JEFFREY W. LADEWIG* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. Census Bureau recently released the results from the 2010 
Census.  In addition to the constitutionally-mandated population count,1 the 
U.S. Census also provides the new apportionment for the House of 
Representatives.2  As the United States’ apportionment population grew 
from 281,424,177 in 2000 to 309,183,463 individuals in 2010,3 the national 
average House district size also grew from 646,952 to 710,767 
individuals.4  Furthermore, although only one state actually had a smaller 
population in 2010 than in 2000 (Michigan’s population decreased by 
0.6%),5 ten states lost seats in 2010 (New York and Ohio each lost two 
seats),6 and eight states gained seats (Florida gained two seats and Texas 
gained four).7  
The federal government has been performing a similar process since 
1790.8  Currently, there are only four constitutional and two statutory 
requirements for the apportionment process.  The first three constitutional 
apportionment requirements are found in Article I, Section 2 of the 
Constitution: (1) no House district can cross state lines; (2) every state 
                                                                                                                          
* Associate Professor, University of Connecticut, Department of Political Science.  
1 See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2 (providing that representatives “shall be apportioned among the 
several States . . . according to their respective Numbers”); Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539, 619 
(1842) (“[T]he Constitution has declared that representatives shall be apportioned among the states 
according to their respective federal numbers; and, for this purpose, it has expressly authorized 
Congress, by law, to provide for an enumeration of the population every ten years; yet the power to 
apportion representatives after this enumeration is made, is nowhere found among the express powers 
given to Congress, but it has always been acted upon as irresistibly flowing from the duty positively 
enjoined by the Constitution.”). 
2 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, APPORTIONMENT DATA—2010 CENSUS, http://2010.census.gov/2010 
census/data/apportionment-data-text.php [hereinafter U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, APPORTIONMENT DATA] 
(last visited Apr. 2, 2011). 
3 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, RESIDENT POPULATION DATA—2010 CENSUS, http://2010.census.gov/ 
news/pdf/apport2010_table4.pdf [hereinafter U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, RESIDENT POPULATION DATA] 
(last visited Apr. 2, 2011). 
4 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, APPORTIONMENT DATA, supra note 2 (showing that the average number 
of people per representative increased from 646,952 in 2000 to 710,767 in 2010). 
5 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, RESIDENT POPULATION DATA, supra note 3.   
6 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, APPORTIONMENT DATA, supra note 2. 
7 Id. 
8 Margo Anderson & Stephen E. Fienberg, Census 2000: Politics and Statistics, 32 U. TOL. L. 
REV. 19, 25 (2000). 
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must have at least one representative; and (3) no state’s average district 
size can be less than 30,000 individuals.9  The fourth constitutional 
requirement is found in Amendment 14, Section 2.  In part, it states, 
“[r]epresentatives shall be apportioned among the several States according 
to their respective numbers.”10   
The two statutory requirements stem from the heated apportionment 
debates (about the size of the chamber as well as the apportionment 
method) during the first half of the twentieth century.  The Apportionment 
Act of 1929 states that the U.S. House is set at 435 seats.11  It also states 
that both the Webster and the Hill methods of apportionment should be 
estimated, and that Congress can then choose which to use.12  In 1941, 
Congress subsequently legislated that the Hill method should be 
exclusively used and implicitly continued to freeze the U.S. House at 435 
seats.13 
These requirements are widely accepted, perhaps to the point of being 
overlooked.  For example, during the current reapportionment, there were 
some discussions in the press and among experts about what the census 
count would be and, thus, which states would gain or lose seats.14  The 
bulk of the discussion, though, was centered on the stage after 
reapportionment: redistricting.  Yet, these six requirements impose 
                                                                                                                          
9 The third constitutional requirement had been a point of some controversy. The primary 
question was whether the Constitution required the national average district size to be not less than 
30,000 individuals, or whether every individual state’s average district size must be not be less than 
30,000 individuals.  As George Washington discovered, the first census and reapportionment in 1790 
presented this question.  The first apportionment plan passed by Congress increased the U.S. Congress 
from 65 seats to 120 seats.  This plan offered the maximum number of seats while keeping the national 
average district size at or above 30,000 individuals.  In so doing, it also provided eight states with state 
average district sizes below 30,000 individuals.  George Washington believed that this plan violated the 
U.S. Constitution and issued the first presidential veto in U.S. history.  Congress then successfully 
redrafted the apportionment with 105 seats and all of the states having state average district sizes above 
30,000 individuals.  MICHEL L. BALINSKI & H. PEYTON YOUNG, FAIR REPRESENTATION: MEETING THE 
IDEAL OF ONE MAN, ONE VOTE 21 (2d ed. 2001).  
10 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. 
11 Reapportionment Act of 1929, ch. 28, § 22, 46 Stat. 21, 26 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 
2a (2006)) (stating that the number of representatives will be apportioned to states from the existing 
total number of representatives), invalidated by Montana v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 775 F. Supp. 
1358, 1366 (D. Mont. 1991).  When Arizona and New Mexico achieved statehood, the total was set at 
435.  Reapportionment Act of 1911, ch. 5, §§ 1–2, 37 Stat. 13, 13–14 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. 
§ 2 (2006)). 
12 Reapportionment Act of 1929 § 22 (stating that apportionment may follow the method of 
“major fractions” or “equal proportions”); see also BALINSKI & YOUNG, supra note 9, at 57 (explaining 
that the Webster method is referred to as “major fractions” and the Hill Method is referred to as “equal 
proportions”). 
13 Act of Nov. 15, 1941, ch. 470, 55 Stat. 761, 761–62 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 2a 
(2006)) (amending the Reapportionment Act of 1929 to specify that apportionment will exclusively 
follow the “method of equal proportions”).  
14 See, e.g., Matt Bloch et al., Census 2010: Gains and Losses in Congress, N.Y. TIMES, 
www.nytimes.com/interactive/2010/12/21/us/census-districts.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2011) (stating 
how the 2010 census results mean that the South and West will gain congressional seats while the 
Northeast and Midwest will lose some). 
 2011] ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE, 435 SEATS 1129 
constraints on congressional apportionment that undermine the ability of 
all six being satisfied.  In other words, there are serious constitutional 
problems with the current congressional apportionment—and, it is 
receiving very little attention.  The remainder of this Article will provide a 
discussion of the constitutional problem as well as constitutional 
evaluations and solutions.  
II.  CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM 
The 2000 Census and reapportionment of the 435 seats in the U.S. 
House of Representatives created a national average district size of 
646,952 individuals.15  Some states, though, were far from this benchmark.  
That is, many states were under- or over-represented compared to the 
national average as well as compared to a number of other states.16 
Perhaps not surprisingly, the 2000 reapportionment provided twenty-
six states with a state average district size that was below the national 
average district size.17  Some of these over-represented states have 
relatively small deviations from the national average.  Some, on the other 
hand, are much more considerable.  The top five over-represented states, 
for example, after the 2000 reapportionment were West Virginia (the 
average district size was 6.58% smaller than the national average district 
size), Iowa (9.36% smaller), Nebraska (11.62% smaller), Rhode Island 
(18.88% smaller), and Wyoming (23.44% smaller).18 
A similar pattern, but actually a more severe one, exists among the 
twenty-four states that have a state average district size larger than the 
national district average.19  The top five most under-represented states 
were: Mississippi (the average district size was 10.24% larger than the 
national average district size), Utah (15.24% larger), South Dakota 
(16.99% larger), Delaware (21.35% larger), and Montana (39.94% 
larger).20  
These deviations from the national average district size are not a 
                                                                                                                          
15 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2000 CENSUS BRIEF ON CONG. APPORTIONMENT 1 (2000), available at 
www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/c2kbr01-7.pdf.  
16 See id. at 2 (listing each state’s population and number of representatives).  
17 See id. (including Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, 
Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New 
Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, and 
Wyoming).   
18 See id. (estimating West Virginia’s average congressional district size at 604,359 persons, 
Iowa’s average district at 586,385 persons, Nebraska’s average district at 571,790 persons, Rhode 
Island’s average district at 524,831 persons, and Wyoming’s average district at 495,304 persons).  
19 See id. (including Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, 
Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, 
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin).  
20 See id. (estimating Mississippi’s average congressional district size at 713,232 persons, Utah’s 
average district at 745,571 persons, South Dakota’s average district at 756,874 persons, Delaware’s 
average district at 785,068 persons, and Montana’s average district at 905,316 persons).  
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localized problem with the 2000 reapportionment. The 2010 
reapportionment reveals that, even though not all of the states are in the 
same position, the pattern of under- and over-representation among the 
states persists.  The current top-five over-represented states after the 2010 
reapportionment are: (5) Vermont (the average district size is 11.32% 
smaller than the national average district size), (4) West Virginia (12.78% 
smaller), (3) Nebraska (14.09% smaller), (2) Wyoming (20.04% smaller), 
and (1) Rhode Island (25.77% smaller).21  The top-five most under-
represented states are: (5) Oregon (the average district size is 8.29% larger 
than the national average district size), (4) Idaho (10.69% larger), (3) South 
Dakota (15.33% larger), (2) Delaware (26.75% larger), and (1) Montana 
(39.91% larger).22  
These deviations in individual states can be compared among each 
other in order to get a sense of the relative deviations.  For instance, after 
the 2000 reapportionment, the average of the absolute difference between 
each state’s average district size and the national average district size, 
(hereinafter referred to as the “Absolute Total Deviation Percentage”), was 
5.75% and, the 2010 Absolute Total Deviation Percentage has increased to 
6.11%.23  In terms of the number of individuals that these percentages 
represent, it means that the average state district size after the 2000 
reapportionment was 37,227 individuals smaller or larger than what the 
national average was and, after the 2010 reapportionment, it is 43,421 
individuals.24  
Another comparative metric that is often used to estimate the relative 
level of variation in any given apportionment is the difference, expressed 
as a percentage of the average national district size, between the average 
district size of the most under-represented and the most over-represented 
states, hereinafter referred to as the Maximum Deviation Percentage.25  
After the 2000 reapportionment, Montana was the most under-represented 
state with an average district size of 905,316 individuals,26 and Wyoming 
was the most over-represented state with an average district size of 
                                                                                                                          
21 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, APPORTIONMENT DATA, supra note 2 (providing the average people 
per representative in the United States and providing the average people per representative for each 
state).  
22 See id. (providing the average people per representative in the United States and providing the 
average people per representative for each state).  
23 These data are a result of the author’s own calculations; for the raw data see id. (providing the 
average people per representative in the United States and providing the average people per 
representative for each state). 
24 These data are a result of the author’s own calculations; for the raw data see id. (providing the 
average people per representative in the United States and providing the average people per 
representative for each state). 
25 See, e.g., Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 728 (1983) (applying the formula to estimate the 
level of variation in the reapportioned districts of New Jersey from the “ideal” figure determined by the 
1980 census).  
26 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, APPORTIONMENT DATA, supra note 2. 
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495,304 individuals.27  The difference is 410,012 individuals, or a 
Maximum Deviation Percentage of 63.38%.  This measurement also 
increased after the 2010 reapportionment to 65.67%: The most under-
represented state is still Montana with an average district size of 994,416,28 
but the most over-represented state is now Rhode Island with an average 
district size of 527,624.29  
To look at these differences another way, the Voter Equivalency 
Ratio,30 after the 2000 reapportionment, indicates that an individual in the 
state of Wyoming has the same representational value as 1.83 individuals 
in the state of Montana.  Or, to reverse the ratio, the representation of a 
person from Montana is worth less than three-fifths of that of a person 
from Wyoming.31  The 2010 Voter Equivalency Ratio indicates that an 
individual in Rhode Island has the same representational value as 1.88 
individuals in Montana.32  
The 2000 and 2010 data show severe levels of interstate 
malapportionment.  That is, the districts across the nation for the U.S. 
House of Representatives have considerably different population sizes.33  It 
is expected, as state-level demographics change in the ten years after a 
census and reapportionment, that there will be growing population 
discrepancies.  This is a consequence of censuses and reapportionments 
being conducted decennially, instead of more frequently.  These data, 
however, indicate that even at the moment when the population sizes 
among the House districts should be most equal, there are still persistent 
and considerable variations.34  
Interstate malapportionment is caused by state population variations as 
well as the constitutional and statute requirements of reapportionment.  No 
state has ever had, nor is one ever likely to have, exactly the same 
population size as, or an exact multiple of, the national average district 
size.  Without either one of these conditions being met for all of the states, 
and given the current constitutional and statute requirement, there will 
always be population remainders when apportioning representatives.  
For example, according to the 2010 Census, the national average 
district size is 710,767 individuals,35 and Connecticut has an apportionment 
                                                                                                                          
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 The Voter Equivalency Ratio is calculated by dividing the average district size of the most 
under-represented state by the average district size of the most over-represented state.   
31 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, APPORTIONMENT DATA, supra note 2 (stating that in 2000, the 
average people per representative in Montana is 905,316 and the average people per representative in 
Wyoming is 495,304). 
32 See id. (stating that in 2010, the average people per representative in Montana was 994,416 and 
527,624 in Rhode Island). 
33 See id. (showing the populations of the different U.S. districts). 
34 See id. (depicting the variation in populations of the different U.S. districts). 
35 See id. (showing that the average number of people per representative is 710,767). 
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population of 3,581,628 individuals.36  Dividing the former into the latter 
indicates that Connecticut deserves 5.039102828 representatives.  
Apportioning the population remainder of 0.039102828 of a representative 
is, of course, impossible.  Given that the 2010 apportionment provides 
Connecticut with five representatives,37 Connecticut will be under-
represented in the 113th through the 118th Congresses by 0.039102828 
representatives.  To put it another way, Connecticut will have a population 
remainder of 27,793 more individuals than an ideal population with five 
representatives, and thus, each House district in Connecticut will, on 
average, be 5,559 individuals larger than the national average district 
size.38   
The problem with population remainders reveals a mathematical 
identity.  Specifically, the smaller the state population, the fewer districts 
the state will have.39  With fewer districts, any population remainder must 
be divided among fewer districts.  As such, smaller states tend to find it 
more difficult to create U.S. House districts that are close to the national 
average district size.40  Therefore, smaller states tend to have greater levels 
of interstate malapportionment than larger states.  
Consider the 2010 Connecticut apportionment again.  A population 
remainder of 27,793 individuals is actually the sixth smallest among all the 
states.41  If Connecticut had the same population remainder, but also only 
had one district, then that one district would be malapportioned by the full 
27,793 individuals.  Alternatively, if Connecticut had the same population 
remainder, but had fifty districts, then each of those fifty districts would 
only be malapportioned by just 556 individuals.  Thus, states with fewer 
House districts are systemically more likely to be under- or over-
                                                                                                                          
36 See id. (showing that there are 3,574,097 people in Connecticut); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
OVERSEAS POPULATION OF THE 50 STATES AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA: 2010 CENSUS tbl.3 
[hereinafter U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, OVERSEAS POPULATION], http://2010.census.gov/news/press-
kits/apportionment/apport.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2011) (follow “PDF” or “Excel” hyperlink to 
download Table 3) (reporting that the population of Connecticut, as of April 1, 2010, includes an 
additional 7,531 people overseas). 
37 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, APPORTIONMENT DATA, supra note 2. 
38 See id. (showing that the average number of people per representative in the United States is 
710,767). 
39 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, APPORTIONMENT POPULATION AND NUMBER OF REPRESENTATIVES, BY 
STATE: 2010 CENSUS tbl.1 [hereinafter U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, APPORTIONMENT POPULATION], 
http://2010.census.gov/news/press-kits/apportionment/apport.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2011) (follow 
“PDF” or “Excel” hyperlink to download Table 1) (showing total state population and apportionment 
of representatives).  
40 Compare U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, A NEW PORTRAIT OF AMERICA, FIRST 2010 CENSUS RESULTS, 
http://2010.census.gov/news/press-kits/apportionment/apport.html (last revised Dec. 12, 2010) (“[E]ach 
member of the U.S. House of Representatives will represent an average population of 710,767.”), with 
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, APPORTIONMENT POPULATION, supra note 39 (showing Montana with one 
representative for 994,416 people). 
41 See discussion supra Part II (describing method for calculating Absolute Total Deviation); U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU, APPORTIONMENT POPULATION, supra note 39 (providing numerical data for 
calculations).  
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represented than states with more House districts.  
 
 
 
Figure 1 graphs each state’s apportionment population and its average 
district size, subtracted from the national-average district size, from 1910 
through 2010.  These are the years that the House has been apportioned 
with 435 members.  The pattern supports the mathematical identity, and it 
demonstrates the range of interstate malapportionment over these years.   
It may be difficult to generate much sympathy for under-represented 
small states when the small states also have an unambiguous undemocratic 
bias in the U.S. Senatearguably, the most malapportioned 
democratically-elected legislative chamber in the world.42  The over-
representation of the small states, though, also makes the larger states 
relatively under-represented vis-à-vis these over-represented small states.  
An egregious, but not even the most severe, example illustrates the 
point.43  After the 2010 reapportionment, Wyoming was the second most 
over-represented state with an apportionment population of 568,300 
                                                                                                                          
42 SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE CONSTITUTION GOES 
WRONG (AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) 50–51 (2006).    
43  Wyoming and California are chosen for this example because they demonstrate the point while 
keeping the math simple.  The most severe results after the 2010 reapportionment are generated from a 
comparison between Rhode Island (the most over-represented state) and Wisconsin (the best 
apportioned state).  The Voter Equivalency Ratio for the former pair is 1.24 and for the latter pair is 
1.35.  
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individuals and was granted one House district.44  This produced a 
population remainder that is the same as the state average deviation from 
the national-average district size: 142,467 individuals.45  Meanwhile, 
California has an apportionment population of 37,341,989 individuals and 
was granted fifty-three House districts.46  This produced a population 
remainder of 328,662 individuals, but a state average deviation from the 
national-average district size of just 6,201 individuals.47  The ratio of the 
apportionment populations of these two states is 66:1, but the ratio of 
granted House districts is 53:1.  This implies that the Voter Equivalency 
Ratio of one individual from Wyoming has the same representational value 
as 1.24 individuals in California.  The over-representation of 
Wyomingas well as other over-represented statesmakes the well-
apportioned, mostly larger, states relatively under-represented.  
This imbalance does not just affect the U.S. House, but also the 
Electoral Collegean institution that is already biased towards the smaller 
states due to the apportionment of the U.S. Senate.  A more accurate 
apportionment would diminish the possibility that a presidential nominee 
could win the Electoral College but lose the popular votelike George W. 
Bush did over Al Gore in the 2000 presidential election.48   
In sum, interstate malapportionment is the systematic pattern of under- 
and over-representation of smaller states.  As a result, it also makes many 
other states, which may actually be well-apportioned (like California in the 
above example), under-represented relative to the over-represented states.  
Together, these point to structural inequalities in the representation in the 
U.S. House of Representatives.  Some states have vastly more 
representational power per individual in the House than other states.  
More importantly, interstate malapportionment is both caused by but 
also violates the set of apportionment requirements prescribed by the U.S. 
Constitution and statutory law.  The 2000 and 2010 reapportionments,49 for 
example, demonstrate that the first three constitutional requirements are 
satisfied: (1) no district crosses state lines, (2) all states have at least one 
representative, and (3) no state has an average district size less than 30,000 
                                                                                                                          
44 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, APPORTIONMENT POPULATION, supra note 39. 
45 The average district size in the United States after the 2010 Census was 710,767.  Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 See generally Paul Boudreaux, The Electoral College and Its Meager Federalism, 88 MARQ. L. 
REV. 195, 195–96 (2004) (arguing, among other things, that the Electoral College does not “avoid the 
possibility of a ‘regional’ winner” but rather “enhances the troubling prospect . . . of a President 
supported by only a minority of voters, in a minority of states”); Brian Knowlton, Decision: It’s Bush: 
Gore Suspends Recount Effort as Texas Governor Savors His Victory, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Dec. 14, 
2000, at 1 (reporting on then Vice President Al Gore’s decision to suspend his recount effort and cede 
the presidency to then Texas Governor George W. Bush); David Stout, The 43rd President: The 
Electoral College, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2000, at A31 (reporting on the operation of the Electoral 
College that had “made Mr. Bush president despite Mr. Gore’s capture of the popular vote”). 
49 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, APPORTIONMENT DATA, supra note 2. 
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individuals.50  Both of the statutory requirements are also satisfied: (1) the 
Hill method of apportionment was used, and (2) the U.S. House has 435 
seats.  But the fourth constitutional requirement is violated.  
Representatives are not apportioned among the several States according to 
their respective numbers.  
III.  CONSTITUTIONAL EVALUATION 
It is clear that the apportionment of the U.S. House is not perfectly 
distributed “among the several States according to their respective  
numbers . . . .”51  As the discussion of the population remainder should also 
make evident, it is impossibleor, at least, infinitely improbablethat it 
ever could be.  But much like the constitutional protection of the freedom 
of speech, the Constitution is not applied without some restraint and 
caveats.  So the question then becomes: Are the current levels of interstate 
malapportionment sufficiently severe to raise constitutional concern? 
To be sure, the U.S. Supreme Court has never ruled on the 
constitutionality of interstate malapportionment.  There is a long history, 
however, of jurisprudence by the Court on intrastate malapportionment.  
Beginning in the 1960s, legislative districts with unequal population sizes 
within states became a prominent constitutional issue in a number of cases 
decided by the Court.  These cases have produced one of most 
recognizable statements on democratic equality and representation: the 
“one person, one vote” constitutional principle. 
In 1962, the Court heard the case Baker v. Carr.52  At the time, 
Tennessee had not reapportioned the districts of their state General 
Assembly since 1901.53  The 1901 apportionment procedure was to assign 
seats according to the total voting population by county.54  In the fifty 
following years, the county population sizes had changed considerably—
not to mention the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920.  Given 
these apportionment procedures, it is not easy to calculate 
malapportionment statistics that have since become common.  Still, an 
example can be illustrative.  According to the 1950 Census, Tennessee had 
1,978,548 voters and the General Assembly had ninety-nine seats; Moore 
County had 2,340 voters and had one representative in the General 
Assembly; and Shelby County had 312,345 voters and seven 
representatives.55  This means that the Moore County seat represented 
2,340 voters, and it was over-represented by 17,645 voters.  The average 
                                                                                                                          
50 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.  
51 Id. amend. XIV, § 2. 
52  Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
53 Id. at 192. 
54 Id. 
55 RICHARD C. CORTNER, THE APPORTIONMENT CASES 267–68 (1970). 
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Shelby County seat represented 44,621 voters, and it was under-
represented by 24,635 voters.  This implies that the Maximum Deviation 
Percentage was 211.56%.  
Baker and the other co-plaintiffs alleged that they suffered, under the 
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, from a debasement of their 
votes because of the population discrepancies among the assembly’s 
districts, such as the one noted between Moore and Shelby counties.56  The 
Court agreed.  It remanded the case back to the district court, which had 
dismissed the case due to issues of jurisdiction and justiciability, and 
ordered it to produce a decision consistent with the Court’s opinion that the 
“complaint’s allegations of a denial of equal protection presented a 
justiciable constitutional cause of action.”57  
The year following Baker, the Court decided Gray v. Sanders.58  The 
plaintiff alleged that Georgia had violated his constitutional rights, also 
under the Equal Protection Clause, by allotting electoral points per 
countybased roughly, but not exactly, on population sizesin the 
primary election for U.S. Senator and other statewide offices.59  The total 
number of county-unit points, not the total number of votes, would decide 
these elections.60  The Court decided that:  
Once the geographical unit for which a representative is to be 
chosen is designated, all who participate in the election are to 
have an equal vote—whatever their race, whatever their sex, 
whatever their occupation, whatever their income, and 
wherever their home may be in that geographical unit.  This 
is required by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.61   
The Court concluded that “[t]he conception of political equality from the 
Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address, to the 
Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments can mean only one 
thing—one person, one vote.”62  This was the Court’s first use of the term 
“one person, one vote.”  
The next year, the Court further enforced and defined the new 
constitutional principle of “one person, one vote” in Wesberry v. Sanders63 
and Reynolds v. Sims.64  Wesberry is particularly relevant to this study, as it 
is the first of the apportionment cases that challenges the population sizes 
                                                                                                                          
56 Baker, 369 U.S. at 199. 
57 Id. 
58 Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963). 
59 Id. at 370. 
60 Id.  
61 Id. at 379.  
62 Id. at 381. 
63 Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 18 (1964). 
64  Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 558 (1964).  
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of seats in the U.S. House of Representatives.  The appellants in Wesberry 
were qualified voters of Fulton County, Georgia concerned about the fact 
that Georgia had not realigned its House districts for the past thirty years.65  
Given the resulting demographic changes that occurred over such a long 
period of time, the population sizes of the districts had become severely 
unequal.66  For example, the appellants were from the Fifth Congressional 
District of Georgia, which had a population of 823,680 individuals, while 
the average district size in Georgia was 394,312.67  Furthermore, one 
district, the Ninth, had a district size of a mere 272,154 individuals.68  
These figures indicate that the Maximum Deviation Percentage in Georgia 
at that time was 138.39%.  
In response to the inequalities in these districts, the Court held that:  
[T]he command of Art. I, § 2, that Representatives be chosen 
“by the People of the several States” means that as nearly as 
is practicable one man’s vote in a congressional election is to 
be worth as much as another’s. . . . We do not believe that the 
Framers of the Constitution intended to permit . . . vote-
diluting discrimination to be accomplished through the 
device of districts containing widely varied numbers of 
inhabitants.  To say that a vote is worth more in one district 
than in another would not only run counter to our 
fundamental ideas of democratic government, it would cast 
aside the principle of a House of Representatives elected “by 
the People,” a principle tenaciously fought for and 
established at the Constitutional Convention.  The history of 
the Constitution, particularly that part of it relating to the 
adoption of Art. I, § 2, reveals that those who framed the 
Constitution meant that, no matter what the mechanics of an 
election, whether statewide or by districts, it was population 
which was to be the basis of the House of Representatives.69  
Accordingly, it can be said that the ruling in Wesberry supports the 
extension of the constitutional principle of “one person, one vote” to the 
U.S. House of Representatives.70  The holding also clearly and forcibly 
states the constitutional foundations of equal representation in the U.S. 
House of Representatives and furthers the process of setting practical limits 
on legislative malapportionment.71  
                                                                                                                          
65 Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 2. 
66 Id. at 7. 
67 Id. at 2. 
68 Id. 
69  Id. at 7−9 (footnotes omitted).  
70 Id. at 18. 
71 Id. 
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In Reynolds v. Sims, a case substantively similar to Baker, the Supreme 
Court held that Alabama’s state legislative district had become 
increasingly, and unconstitutionally, malapportioned since its last 
apportionment in 1900.72  Again, the Court reiterated the constitutional 
requirement of equal legislative populations:  
To the extent that a citizen’s right to vote is debased, he 
is that much less a citizen.  The fact that an individual lives 
here or there is not a legitimate reason for overweighting or 
diluting the efficacy of his vote.  The complexions of 
societies and civilizations change, often with amazing 
rapidity.  A nation once primarily rural in character becomes 
predominantly urban.  Representation schemes once fair and 
equitable become archaic and outdated.  But the basic 
principle of representative government remains, and must 
remain, unchanged—the weight of a citizen’s vote cannot be 
made to depend on where he lives.  Population is, of 
necessity, the starting point for consideration and the 
controlling criterion for judgment in legislative 
apportionment controversies.73  
The Court ordered that Alabama’s districts must be “as nearly of equal 
population as is practicable.”74  
In 1968, the Court was asked if the Equal Protection Clause also 
applied to local governments.  In Avery v. Midland County, the Midland 
County, Texas Commissioners Court—the governing body of the county—
had elective districts with vastly unequal populations.75  The Court, again, 
applied the constitutional requirement of “one person, one vote,” and 
reiterated that it is a fundamental constitutional principle applicable across 
the nation and across all levels of government:  
Government—National, State, and local—must grant to each 
citizen the equal protection of its laws, which includes an 
equal opportunity to influence the election of lawmakers, no 
matter how large the majority wishing to deprive other 
citizens of equal treatment or how small the minority who 
object to their mistreatment.76  
In the fifteen years after Avery, the Court heard a number of additional 
cases in which it further defined and enforced the constitutional principle 
of “one person, one vote.”  At least four of these concerned apportionment 
                                                                                                                          
72 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568−69 (1964). 
73 Id. at 567 (footnote omitted). 
74 Id. at 577.  
75 Avery v. Midland Cnty., 390 U.S. 474, 475–76 (1968). 
76 Id. at 482 n.6.  
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among seats in the U.S. House of Representatives.  The first is Kirkpatrick 
v. Preisler, which concerned the redistricting of Missouri’s House seats.77  
The Court affirmed the lower court’s decision, which held that the 
apportionment plan “did not meet the constitutional standard of equal 
representation for equal numbers of people ‘as nearly as practicable.’”78  
The plan had apportioned districts with an Absolute Total Deviation 
Percentage of 1.61% and a Maximum Deviation Percentage of 5.97%.  The 
Voter Equivalency Ratio, the population ratio of the most under-
represented district to the most over-represented district, was 1.061.79  
The second case is Wells v. Rockefeller, which involved a challenge to 
New York’s plan to apportion its forty-one U.S. House districts.80  The 
plan apportioned districts with an Absolute Total Deviation Percentage of 
3.79% and a Maximum Deviation Percentage of 13.09%.  The Voter 
Equivalency Ratio was 1.042.  New York tried to justify its apportionment 
plan with two arguments.  First, the State argued that it created the districts 
to maintain population equality among districts within a geographic region 
(for instance, those in parts of Manhattan, Queens, the Bronx, or those 
around Buffalo and Erie), even though these relatively equal regions 
differed in size across the regions.81  The Court disagreed with the logic: 
“Equality of population among districts in a sub-state is not a justification 
for inequality among all the districts in the State.”82  Second, some of the 
upstate population deviation arose from the state attempting to apportion 
whole counties.  The Court also disagreed with this: “Nor are the variations 
in the ‘North country’ districts justified by the fact that these districts are 
constructed of entire counties.”83 
The third case, White v. Weiser,84 challenged the redistricting of 
Texas’s twenty-four U.S. House districts.  Texas’s original plan 
apportioned districts with an Absolute Total Deviation Percentage of 
0.75% and a Maximum Deviation Percentage of 4.13%.  The Voter 
Equivalency Ratio was 1.042.  Even though these were the smallest levels 
of malapportionment that the Court had heard to date, it held that these 
deviations “were not ‘unavoidable,’ and the districts were not as 
mathematically equal as reasonably possible.”85  
The fourth case, Karcher v. Daggett, involved the redistricting plan of 
New Jersey following the 1980 U.S. Census.86  This case presented the 
                                                                                                                          
77 Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 528 (1969).  
78 Id. at 529–30. 
79 Id. at 529 n.1. 
80 Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542, 543 (1969).  
81 Id. at 545–46.  
82 Id. at 546. 
83 Id. 
84 412 U.S. 783, 784 (1973).  
85 Id. at 790. 
86 462 U.S. 725, 727 (1983). 
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Court with malapportionment figures even smaller than those found in 
White.  The plan apportioned districts with an Absolute Total Deviation 
Percentage of 0.1384% and a Maximum Deviation Percentage of 
0.6984%.87  The Voter Equivalency Ratio was 1.007.  The appellants 
defending the original New Jersey apportionment argued that the 
population differences were de minimis—in other words, the differences 
were not functionally different from zero given the imprecision of the 
original Census figures.88  The Court did not agree and went to lengths to 
reiterate the previous arguments of, in particular, Wesberry and 
Kirkpatrick.89  It affirmed that the constitutional requirement of “one 
person, one vote,” found in the “equal representation” standard of Article I, 
Section 2, necessitated an implementation that provides legislative districts 
that are as equal “as nearly as practicable.”90  Even a Maximum Deviation 
Percentage of less than one percent may not meet that standard.  
All of the above cases played an important role in defining and 
enforcing the constitutional requirement of “one person, one vote.”  Since 
the Court has decided these cases, “one person, one vote” has become a 
foundational principle—for the Court as well as the public—of democratic 
representation.  
Still, all of these cases only address intrastate malapportionment: 
population variances among districts within a single state.  There is 
nothing, however, within these cases that explicitly limits this 
constitutional requirement to state variations.  The constitutional 
requirement is not “one person in one state, one vote in one state.”  In fact, 
there are at least two reasons to posit that the constitutional requirement 
should be applied equally within states as well as among states.  
First, the Court has gone to great lengths to express the constitutional 
requirement as a normative requirement: representational equality is a 
fundamental principle of American democracy.  The Court, for example, 
concluded its majority opinion in Wesberry as follows:  
While it may not be possible to draw congressional 
districts with mathematical precision, that is no excuse for 
ignoring our Constitution’s plain objective of making equal 
representation for equal numbers of people the fundamental 
goal for the House of Representatives.  That is the high 
standard of justice and common sense which the Founders set 
for us.91 
Second, the premise of the “Great Compromise” during the 
                                                                                                                          
87 Id. at 728.  
88 Id. at 735–36.  
89 Id. at 732–33. 
90 Id. at 730 (quoting Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 18 (1964)).   
91  Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 18. 
 2011] ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE, 435 SEATS 1141 
Constitutional Convention of 1787 was that the apportionment of the U.S. 
House, which represented individuals, would balance the apportionment of 
the U.S. Senate, which represented individual states.92  This requires that 
individuals be equally represented across the states and not just within 
them—for U.S. Senators have perfectly equal intrastate apportionment, but 
vastly unequal interstate apportionment.  The Federalists and Anti-
Federalists both expressed sentiments in this vein.  For instance, James 
Wilson, a delegate from Pennsylvania to the Constitutional Convention, 
argued on June 9, 1787 that “equal numbers of people ought to have an 
equal [number] of representatives.”93  Wilson continued “[e]very citizen of 
one state possesses the same rights with the citizen of another.”94  Despite 
opposing the passage of the U.S. Constitution, at least one Anti-Federalist 
viewed the apportionment of the U.S. House in a similar light.  In Essay III 
by Brutus (Robert Yates), published on November 15, 1787, the author 
states that the House “is to be chosen by the people of the respective states, 
in proportion to the number of their inhabitants.”95  
These expectations were made explicit in Article I, Section 2 of the 
U.S. Constitution and refined in the Fourteenth Amendment: 
“Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according 
to their respective numbers.”96  To point, the Amendment does not read 
“within the several States,” but “among the several States.”  
Given these points, it is difficult to assume—perhaps, even illogical 
given the malapportionment comparisons with Senatorsthat the Framers 
of the Constitution or the Court meant to restrict the requirement of equal 
representation to only within states, irrespective of any inequality among 
the states.  Nor does it seem plausible that the Constitution is meant to 
apply to state policiessuch as the state-level apportionment plans for 
local, state, and federal districts—but not to federal policies.  In sum, there 
are few, if any, normative, logical, or constitutional justifications that can 
be made that would delineate any constitutional differences between 
intrastate malapportionment and interstate malapportionment.  
 
                                                                                                                          
92 WALTER B. MEAD, THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION: PERSONALITIES, PRINCIPLES, AND 
ISSUES 71 (1987). 
93 Notes by James Madison on the Proceedings of Committee of the Whole House (June 9th, 
1787), in 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 179 (Max Farrand ed., 1911).  
94 Notes by Robert Yates on the Proceedings of Committee of the Whole House (June 9th, 1787), 
in 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 183 (Max Farrand ed., 1911). 
95 BRUTUS, ESSAY III (1787), reprinted in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST WRITINGS OF THE MELANCTON 
SMITH CIRCLE 185–86 (Michael P. Zuckert & Derek A. Webb eds., 2009). 
96 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. 
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Wesberry v. 
Sanders
Kirkpatrick v. 
Preisler
Wells v. 
Rockefeller
White v. 
Weiser
Karcher v. 
Daggett
2000 Interstate 
Malapportion-
ment 
2010 Interstate 
Malapportion-
ment 
Ideal District Size 394,312 431,981 409,340 466,530 526,059 646,952 710,767
Most Over-Represented Size 272,154 419,721 382,277 458,581 523,798 495,304 527,624
Deviation (#) 122,158 12,260 27,063 7,949 2,261 151,648 183,143
Deviation (%) 30.98% 2.84% 6.61% 1.70% 0.43% 23.44% 25.77%
Most Under-Represented Size 823,680 445,523 435,880 477,856 527,472 905,316 994,416
Deviation (#) 429,368 13,542 26,540 11,326 1,413 258,364 283,649
Deviation (%) 108.89% 3.13% 6.48% 2.43% 0.27% 39.94% 39.91%
Maximum Deviation (#) 551,526 25,802 53,603 19,275 3,674 410,012 466,793
Maximum Deviation (%) 139.87% 5.97% 13.09% 4.13% 0.70% 63.38% 65.67%
Absolute Total Deviation (#) n.a. 6,912 15,519 3,421 726 37,227 43,421
Absolute Total Deviation (%) n.a. 1.60% 3.79% 0.75% 0.14% 5.75% 6.11%
Voter Equivalency Raitio 3.03 1.06 1.14 1.04 1.01 1.83 1.88
Supreme Court's Decision Unconstitutional Unconstitutional Unconstitutional Unconstitutional Unconstitutional
Table 1. Constitutional Determinations of Congressional Apportionment
 
 
In light of this, Table 1 provides a summary of the intrastate 
malapportionment measurements found in the Supreme Court cases 
concerning the U.S. House of Representatives as well as the 2000 and  
2010 interstate malapportionments discussed above.  The intrastate 
malapportionment discussed in Wesberry was more severe than the 
malapportionment in any of the other cases cited.  The last of these cases, 
Karcher, involved Maximum Deviation measurements of just 3,674 
individuals, or 0.7% of the state-average district size.  The Maximum 
Deviation measurements of interstate malapportionment after the 2000 
Census were 410,012 individuals, or 63.38% of the national-average 
district size.  The same measurements after the 2010 Census were 466,792 
individuals, or 65.67%.  
In other words, the 2000 interstate Maximum Deviation measurement 
for individuals is 11,160% larger than the levels declared unconstitutional 
in Karcher.  As a percentage of the ideal district size, it is 9,054% larger.  
The 2010 interstate Maximum Deviation for individuals is 12,705% larger 
than the levels declared unconstitutional in Karcher; and, as a percentage 
of the ideal district size, it is 9,381% larger.  
The levels of interstate malapportionment are massive compared to the 
levels of intrastate malapportionment in many of the cases that defined and 
enforced the constitutional principle of “one person, one vote.”  If the 
Constitution mandates “equal representation” as the Court has said that it 
does, then any malapportionment should raise constitutional concern.  The 
Court has been vigorous and forceful in its denunciation and mitigation of 
intrastate malapportionment.  In the process, the Court has ruled a number 
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of state districting statutes to be unconstitutional.97  The Court, however, 
has not spoken to the issue of interstate malapportionment.98  If there is a 
remedy that is constitutional—even if statutes need to be deemed 
unconstitutional—then the Court should be equally vigorous and forceful 
in its application of the principle of “one person, one vote”99 in the context 
of interstate malapportionment.  
IV.  CONSTITUTIONAL SOLUTIONS 
Interstate malapportionment is a problem caused by the incongruent 
mix of constitutional and statutory apportionment requirements and by the 
growing, but unequal, state populations.  These factors cause smaller states 
to have too few districts to adequately distribute their population 
remainders.100  There are a number of extra-constitutional solutions to this 
problem.  For example, if House districts were allowed to cross state lines, 
House members’ roll-call votes were weighted by the home state’s average 
district size, or the United States switched to a system of proportional 
representation instead of single-member districts, then the issue of 
interstate malapportionment could be eliminated almost entirely.101  But, 
each of these would require a constitutional amendment; and, if an 
amendment is possible, then the first order of business should be to change 
the vastly more egregious interstate malapportionment of the U.S. 
Senate.102  
                                                                                                                          
97 See, e.g., White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 794–97 (1973) (declaring a Texas plan for 
congressional redistricting unconstitutional and mandating that the state enact an alternate plan); 
Reynolds v. Simms, 377 U.S. 533, 587 (1964) (holding that the existing and two legislatively-proposed 
plans for apportionment of seats in the two houses of the Alabama Legislature were invalid under the 
Equal Protection Clause in that the apportionment was not on a population basis and completely lacked 
rationality); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 209–10 (1962) (holding that a complaint containing 
allegations that a state statute effected an apportionment that deprived plaintiffs of equal protection of 
the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment presented a justiciable constitutional cause of 
action). 
98 See Jeffrey W. Ladewig & Mathew P. Jasinski, On the Causes and Consequences of and 
Remedies for Interstate Malapportionment of the U.S. House of Representatives, 6 PERSP. ON POL. 89, 
90 (2008) (“Despite the Court’s aggressive stance toward intrastate malapportionment, it declined its 
only opportunity to date to address interstate malapportionment.”). 
99 See, e.g., LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN 
REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 152 (1994) (explaining that the “one-vote, one-value” principle makes 
the assumption that each voter should enjoy the same opportunity to effect election outcomes); 
Ladewig & Jasinski, supra note 98, at 89 (citing the Court’s efforts to reduce intrastate 
malapportionment). 
100 Ladewig & Jasinski, supra note 98, at 92–93. 
101 See id. at 95, 102 (stating that each of these methods could “go a long way in reducing or 
eliminating malapportionment and is deserving of greater debate”). 
102 To the point, many find the malapportionment of the Senate troubling.  The Senate, though, is 
perfectly apportioned in terms of the all of the Supreme Court intrastate malapportionment cases 
discusssedthat is, no state has different “district” populations for their own Senators.  Instead, the 
Senate only has interstate malapportionmentdifferent “district” populations among the states.  If the 
interstate malapportionment of the Senate can be so troubling for some, should not the House and its 
interstate malapportionment also raise their ire?    
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This leaves consideration of the two statutory requirements for 
apportionment.  First, the current apportionment methodthe Hill (or 
Equal Proportions) methodwas set by the Apportionment Act of 1941.103  
Since the founding of the country, Congress has debated and used about 
six different apportionment methods.104  Each of these methods apportions 
seats by way of different mathematical formulas;105 each has its own 
advantages and disadvantages.  For instance, Balinski and Young argue 
that the Webster method—not the Hill method—better approximates the 
constitutional principle of “one person, one vote.”106  
The Court addressed the constitutionality of the Hill method in U.S. 
Department of Commerce v. Montana.107  Montana argued that a third 
apportionment method, the Dean (or Harmonic Mean) method, better 
approximates the constitutional principles found in Wesberry.108  Using the 
Dean method for the 1990 reapportionment, not coincidentally, would have 
also provided Montana, at the expense of Washington state, with an 
additional U.S. House district; there would have been no other changes 
across the country.109  This change would have decreased the Absolute 
Total Deviation, but it would have increased the relative deviations 
between these two states.  
The Court stated that the intrastate malapportionmentas indicated 
abovepointed to no single standard by which equality must be 
measured.110  Given that each apportionment method minimizes a different 
equality measurement,111 the Court held that Congress had the discretion to 
choose the method that it deemed best—thereby rejecting Montana’s 
argument.112  
There are four particularly relevant consequences for this Article from 
U.S. Department of Commerce v. Montana.  First, unlike the intrastate 
malapportionment cases, U.S. Department of Commerce v. Montana 
concerns issues that relate, though are not identical, to interstate 
malapportionment.113  Second, the Court declared the apportionment 
method of the House is not a political question beyond the reach of the 
Court, and that interstate malapportionment is justiciable.114  Third, the 
                                                                                                                          
103  2 U.S.C. § 2a (2006). 
104 See generally BALINSKI & YOUNG, supra note 9 (describing the various methods that have 
been used  over the history of the United States and their effects on representation). 
105 See id. at ix (examining the various formulas utilized by each method of 
apportionment). 
106  Id. at 23–35. 
107  U.S. Dep’t of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442, 460–66 (1992).  
108 Id. at 460–61. 
109 Id. at 461–62 & n.40. 
110 Id. at 463. 
111 Id. at 454–55. 
112 Id. at 452–54. 
113 Id. at 445. 
114 Id. at 458. 
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Court concluded that Wesberry and the other cases that defined the 
principle of “one person, one vote” are likely applicable to issues of 
interstate malapportionment.115  Specifically, the Court stated:  
There is some force to the argument that the same 
historical insights that informed our construction of Article I, 
§ 2, in the context of intrastate districting should apply here 
as well.  As we interpreted the constitutional command that 
Representatives be chosen “by the People of the several 
States” to require the States to pursue equality in 
representation, we might well find that the requirement that 
Representatives be apportioned among the several States 
“according to their respective Numbers” would also embody 
the same principle of equality.  Yet it is by no means clear 
that the facts here establish a violation of the Wesberry 
standard.116  
Fourth, switching apportionment methods (even if to the unlikely 
alternative of the Dean method) may decrease some of the interstate 
malapportionment measurements.117  Although it would not happen with 
every decennial census count, switching from the Hill to the Dean method 
for the 1990 reapportionment would have reduced both the Maximum 
Deviation Percentage (from 60.73% to 52.09%)a nonmarginal 
amountas well as the Absolute Total Deviation Percentage among all of 
the states (from 5.97% to 5.79%).  
Even if the Court held that the Maximum Deviation measurements are 
the standard by which interstate malapportionment should be evaluated, 
switching from the Hill to the Dean methods would have typically 
produced only modest improvements.  And, it would have still left the 
Maximum Deviation Percentage well above almost all of the intrastate 
malapportionments ruled unconstitutional.  In other words, perhaps a 
change in apportionment methods could better apportion the House along 
the lines of “one person, one vote”though, as mentioned before, that is 
disputed by the Court because of no clear measure of equality118but in 
almost all circumstances the change would affect only a handful of seats 
and states.119  And, it is unlikely that these changes would make much 
headway in diminishing interstate malapportionment.  As such, the first 
                                                                                                                          
115 Id. at 460. 
116 Id. at 461.  
117 Id. at 443. 
118 See id. at 463 (“What is the better measure of inequalityabsolute difference in district size, 
absolute difference in share of a Representative, or relative difference in district size or share?  Neither 
mathematical analysis nor constitutional interpretation provides a conclusive answer.”).   
119 See BALINSKI & YOUNG, supra note 9, at 157–80, for a comparison of all six apportionment 
methods as applied to the states during each of the reapportionments from 1790 to 2000.  
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statutory requirement of apportionmentthe use of the Hill methoddoes 
not seem to be a major factor in causing, or changing it would not be a 
major factor in mitigating, interstate malapportionment.  
The second statutory requirement for the apportionment of the House 
is the fixed number of seats.120  The Constitution is silent on the size of the 
House—other than the initial 1789 apportionment size,121 but the Founders 
were not silent.  In fact, it was hotly debated among them.122  The Founders 
discussed the size of the House in at least three ways.  The first was 
through their intent that House members should represent an equal number 
of individuals, as discussed above.123  The second was through their 
concern that district sizes would be too large.  For example, the only time 
that George Washington spoke during the Constitutional Convention was 
to register his concern that a minimum district size of 40,000 individuals 
was too large.124  Washington favored the proposal suggested by Nathaniel 
Gorham of Massachusetts to change the minimum to 30,000 individuals; 
after Washington spoke, it passed with no opposition.125  And Madison, in 
The Federalist No. 55, suggested that district sizes should be kept small 
enough for district representatives to “possess a proper knowledge of the 
local circumstances of their numerous constituents.”126   
The third way the Founders discussed the size of the House was 
through their intent that the House should grow in size in some proportion 
with the growth of the U.S. population.  For instance, Madison argued in 
The Federalist No. 55, “I take for granted here what I shall in answering 
the fourth objection hereafter show, that the number of representatives will 
be augmented from time to time in the manner provided by the 
[C]onstitution.”127  Or, as he argued in The Federalist No. 58, 
The remaining charge against the [H]ouse of 
[R]epresentatives, which I am to examine, is grounded on a 
                                                                                                                          
120 The Apportionment Act of 1911 set this number at 433, but the current number is 435.  
Apportionment Act of 1911, ch. 5, § 1, 37 Stat. 13, 13 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 2a (2006)).   
121 The original size of the House was sixty-five persons.  BALISNKI & YOUNG, supra note 9, at 8.  
According to the Constitution, “Representatives . . . shall be apportioned among the several States . . . 
according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of 
free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, 
three fifths of all other Persons.”  U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 3.  This provision was modified, however, 
by the Fourteenth Amendment.  Id. amend. XIV, § 2.  
122 See BALINSKI & YOUNG, supra note 9, at 11–13 (describing the debate between the Founders 
on the size of the House, and noting that “[t]he contest over the division of seats arose from deep 
political divisions: the emerging conflict between North and South, between Republican and Federalist, 
between agricultural and industrial interests”).   
123 See supra notes 92–95 and accompanying text.  
124 Report of Committee of Style, Notes of James Madison, Sept. 17, 1787, in 2 THE RECORDS OF 
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION OF 1787, at 590, 644 (Max Farrand ed., 1911).   
125 Id. at 643–44.  
126 THE FEDERALIST NO. 55, at 141, 143 (James Madison) (J. & A. McLean ed., 1788).   
127 Id. at 144. 
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supposition that the number of members will not be 
augmented from time to time, as the progress of population 
may demand.  It has been admitted that this objection, if well 
supported, would have great weight.128   
In fact, the first Congress of the United States passed twelve amendments 
to the Constitution, the first of which established that the number of House 
seats would increase at a diminishing rate along with the U.S. 
population.129  This amendment came one state short of passing and 
becoming part of the Bill of Rights.130  Still, the House generally followed 
the intentions of this proposed amendment.   
The initial size of the House in 1789 was sixty-five seats.131  The 
following year, the first Census and reapportionment were conducted, and 
Congress increased the size of the House to 105 seats.132  From 1790 
through 1910, after each decennial census, Congress changed the size of 
the House—in only one of these changes, in 1840, was the size 
decreased.133  In the 1910 reapportionment, the size of the House was 
increased to 435 seats.134  And, during the 1920 reapportionment, the initial 
proposal was to increase the size to 483, but it was defeated by a coalition 
of those who felt that the House was becoming “unwieldy”135 as well as by 
members from rural states that stood to lose members to the states with 
larger urban areasthe 1920 Census was the first to show the United 
States as a majority urban country.136  
With no apportionment legislation, the House stayed at 435 seats.  A 
similar constellation of issues arose before the 1930 Census and 
reapportionment.  In response, in 1929 Congress passed, and President 
Hoover signed, the Reapportionment Act of 1929,137 which froze the U.S. 
House of Representatives at 435 seats.138  The Apportionment Act of 1941, 
which replaced the 1929 Act, established the Hill method of apportionment 
                                                                                                                          
128 THE FEDERALIST NO. 58, at 160 (James Madison) (J. & A. McLean ed., 1788). 
129 See CHARLES W. EAGLES, DEMOCRACY DELAYED: CONGRESSIONAL REAPPORTIONMENT AND 
URBAN-RURAL CONFLICT IN THE 1920S, at 23 (1990) (describing the First Congress’s first amendment 
to the Constitution). 
130 Id. 
131 Id. at 21–22. 
132 Id. at 23, 25. 
133 See id. at 26 (“The Senate insisted on a smaller House and on abandoning Jefferson’s 
approach, in use since 1792. . . .  The adopted ratio . . . for the first time actually shrank the House of 
Representatives to . . . fewer than provided in 1832.”). 
134 See id. at 21 (noting that, by 1912, U.S. House membership stood at 435 representatives). 
135 BRIAN FREDERICK, CONGRESSIONAL REPRESENTATION & CONSTITUENTS: THE CASE FOR 
INCREASING THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 25–26 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
136 EAGLES, supra note 129, at 116; FREDERICK, supra note 135, at 25–26; Congressional 
Apportionment, NAT’L ATLAS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, http://www.nationalatlas.gov/ 
articles/boundaries/a_conApport.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2011). 
137 Reapportionment Act of 1929, ch. 28, § 22, 46 Stat. 21, 26 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 
2a (2006)). 
138 FREDERICK, supra note 135, at 29–30. 
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and continued freezing the House at 435 seats.139  No legislation to change 
the number of seats of the House has passed since 1941except for the 
temporary extension of one seat for each of the newly admitted states of 
Alaska and Hawaii in 1959.140  As such, the size of the lower chamber has 
basically remained at its fixed size of 435 seats since 1910.141   
Perhaps a House with 435 seats has become publically accepted.  But it 
is clear that the House has not always been this size or fixed at one size.  
Furthermore, the Founders believed that the House size should change 
along with the U.S. population, and it did change for the first 120 years of 
the country.142  It is currently set at 435 seats only by a federal statute.143   
Will changing the size of the House mitigate interstate 
malapportionment?  The answer is somewhat complicated.  This is because 
of four factors.  First, given the pattern of state populations, unless the 
House is increased in size to the apportionment population of the United 
Statesin other words, everyone is a member of the U.S. House of 
Representatives—there will always be a population remainder.  Regardless 
of the difficulties this would generate, if everyone is a representative, then 
“districts” would be less than 30,000 individualsthey would be one 
individualand thereby unconstitutional.  Perfect equality, therefore, is 
impossible to achieve under the current constitutional requirements.  
Regardless of size, the House will never perfectly attain the constitutional 
standard of “one person, one vote.”  
Second, the pattern of the malapportionment measurementsas the 
House size is expandeddepends on the specific distribution of state 
populations.  As the distribution of state populations changes after each 
Census, so does the pattern.  Third, with certain distributions of state 
populations, an increase in the House size can actually cause some 
measurements of interstate malapportionment to increase.  This is 
generated because the most under-represented state is not always the next 
state to receive an additional district,144 but the national-average district 
size always decreases.  Fourth, as the Court noted in U.S. Department of 
Commerce v. Montana, there is no constitutional definition of how to 
measure interstate malapportionment.145  And, the different measures do 
not always change at the same rate or in the same direction.  
                                                                                                                          
139 Apportionment Act of 1941, ch. 470, §§ 1–2(a), 55 Stat. 761, 761–62 (codified as amended at 
2 U.S.C. § 2a (2006)). 
140 Congressional Apportionment, supra note 136.  
141 See id. (noting that the number of seats in the U.S. House of Representatives has remained at 
435 since 1911, with the exception of the temporary increase in size following the admission of Alaska 
and Hawaii into statehood). 
142 See supra note 133 and accompanying text. 
143 See supra notes 137–39 and accompanying text.  
144 See infra notes 148–49 and accompanying text. 
145 U.S. Dep’t of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442, 463 (1992). 
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The recent decennial distributions of state populations create a pattern 
for the interstate malapportionment measurements that, if the House size is 
changed, is similar to a “saw-tooth” pattern.  As the number of seats 
increases, for example, many of the malapportionment measurements 
actually also increase until the most under-represented state is granted an 
additional district, at which point there is typically a sharp drop in the 
measurements.  As the size of the House continues to increase, these 
measurements will again rise, until the next most under-represented state is 
granted an additional district.  As such, the Court’s standard that 
malapportionment should be decreased as much as is “practicable”146 leads 
to an examination of when interstate malapportionment is locally 
minimized; if it is practicable to further increase the size of the House, then 
the next sharp drop to a new (and typically lower) localized minimum 
should be considered.  
 
Seats 435 436 437 438 439 440 441 442 443 444 445
Ideal District Size 646,952 645,468 643,991 642,521 641,057 639,600 638,150 636,706 635,269 633,838 632,414
Last State to Get a Seat Carolina Utah New York Texas Michigan Indiana Montana Illinois Mississippi California Wisconsin
Most Over-Represented State Wyoming Wyoming Wyoming Wyoming Wyoming Wyoming Montana Montana Montana Montana Montana
Most Over-Represented Size 495,304 495,304 495,304 495,304 495,304 495,304 452,658 452,658 452,658 452,658 452,658
Deviation (#) 151,648 150,164 148,687 147,217 145,753 144,296 185,492 184,048 182,611 181,180 179,756
Deviation (%) 23.44% 23.26% 23.09% 22.91% 22.74% 22.56% 29.07% 28.91% 28.75% 28.58% 28.42%
Most Under-Represented State Montana Montana Montana Montana Montana Montana Delaware Delaware Delaware Delaware Delaware
Most Under-Represented Size 905,316 905,316 905,316 905,316 905,316 905,316 785,068 785,068 785,068 785,068 785,068
Deviation (#) 258,364 259,848 261,325 262,795 264,259 265,716 146,918 148,362 149,799 151,230 152,654
Deviation (%) 39.94% 40.26% 40.58% 40.90% 41.22% 41.54% 23.02% 23.30% 23.58% 23.86% 24.14%
Maximum Deviation (#) 410,012 410,012 410,012 410,012 410,012 410,012 332,410 332,410 332,410 332,410 332,410
Maximum Deviation (%) 63.38% 63.52% 63.67% 63.81% 63.96% 64.10% 52.09% 52.21% 52.33% 52.44% 52.56%
Absolute Total Deviation (#) 37,227 36,893 36,817 36,718 36587 36,437 34,833 34,792 34,538 34,520 34,518
Absolute Total Deviation (%) 5.75% 5.72% 5.72% 5.71% 5.71% 5.70% 5.46% 5.46% 5.44% 5.45% 5.46%
Voter Equivalency Raitio 1.83 1.83 1.83 1.83 1.83 1.83 1.73 1.73 1.73 1.73 1.73
Table 2. Congressional Apportionment: 2000 Interstate Malapportionment 
 
 
Consider, for example, the apportionment of the Houseby the Hill 
methodwith 435 seats after the 2000 Census (see Table 2).  North 
Carolina was granted the 435th seat;147 if the House were to be increased to 
                                                                                                                          
146 Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1964). 
147 Matt Canham, Census Count To Exclude Overseas Missionaries—Again, SALT LAKE TRIB., 
Aug. 16, 2009, available at http://ldsfiles.com/newforums/lds-news-ldsfiles-com/21084-census-count-
exclude-overseas-missionaries-again-salt-lake-tribune.html. 
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436 seats, Utahnot the most under-represented state of 
Montana148would be granted the 436th seat.149  As such, the Maximum 
Deviation as measured by the number of individuals would remain at 
410,012 individuals.  But, because the national average district size would 
decrease (from 646,952 to 645,468 individuals) and the most under-
represented state is more malapportioned than the most over-represented 
state, the Maximum Deviation Percentage actually increases (from 63.38% 
to 63.52%).  Still, the Absolute Total Deviationexpressed as the number 
of individuals or as a percent of the National Average District 
Sizedecreases.  This pattern persists until the 441st seat is granted to 
Montana.150  At this point, there are considerable drops in almost all of the 
interstate malapportionment measurements.  For instance, the Maximum 
Deviation Percentage drops appreciably from a 64.01% to 52.09%, and the 
Absolute Total Deviation Percentage drops from 5.70% to 5.46%.  The one 
statistic that still increases is the malapportionment of the most over-
represented state.  As Montana is granted its second district, it moves from 
the most under-represented state to the most over-represented state.151  
And, Montana is more over-represented than the previous most over-
represented state, Wyoming.152    
Nonetheless, the addition of just six seats to the House after the 2000 
reapportionment would reduce the key measurements of interstate 
malapportionment: Maximum Deviation Percentage decreases by 18.74% 
and Absolute Total Deviation Percentage decreases by 4.18%.153  As more 
seats are initially added, the pattern of small increases in the Maximum 
Deviation Percentage resumesbut, it is still less than what it was before 
the addition of the 441st seat.  And, the Absolute Total Deviation 
                                                                                                                          
148 See Peter Baker, Expand the House?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2009, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/18/us/politics/18baker.html (intimating that Montana is the most 
populated state with only one House vote); see also supra notes 26–30 and accompanying text.  
149 See D’Vera Cohn, Census 2010: The Last Seat in Congress, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Jan. 11, 
2011), http://census.pewsocialtrends.org/2011/census-2010-the-last-seat-in-congress (“After the 2000 
Census, when North Carolina won the 435[th] seat, Utah would have been next in line . . . .”). 
150 FAIRVOTE, IMPACT OF INCREASING HOUSE SIZE, http://archive.fairvote.org/?page=1765 (last 
visited Apr. 2, 2011). 
151 As explained in Part II, after the 2010 reapportionment, Montana stands as the most under-
represented state in the country, with 994,416 citizens in one district, while Rhode Island, with an 
average district size of 527,624 citizens, is the most over-represented state.  See supra Part II.  Given 
these statistics, once Montana receives a second seat in the House of Representatives, it will overtake 
Rhode Island for smallest average district size and, in turn, most over-represented state.  
152 See Bob Unruh, Lawsuit Seeks Larger House Under ‘One Person, One Vote,’ 
WORLDNETDAILY (Sept. 17, 2009, 3:44 PM), http://www.wnd.com/?pageId=110124 (noting that 
Wyoming was the most over-represented state according to the 2000 census).   
153 Shrinking the size of the House would have the opposite effect.  That is, ironically, there 
would be very small improvements in some of the interstate malapportionment statistics as the House is 
shrunk smaller than 435 seats until enough seats are removed that a new state replaces Montana as the 
most under-represented.  At which point, there is a spike upwards in the interstate malapportionment 
statistics.  
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Percentage continues to decrease until the 444th seat is added; then, it, too, 
begins to increase slightly. 
This example demonstrates at least three things.  First, there is a “saw-
tooth” pattern for the interstate malapportionment measurements as the 
House size is increased.  It also demonstrates that the different interstate 
malapportionment measurements follow a similar, but not identical, pattern 
as the House size increases.  Third, it defines the first House-seat size 
above 435 that provides a localized minimum at 441 seats. That is, the 
interstate malapportionment measurements are higher prior to and after the 
441-seat apportionmentat least until the next “saw-tooth” drop occurs.  
Thus, the addition of this seat makes nonmarginal improvements in both 
the Absolute Total Deviation Percentage and the Maximum Deviation 
Percentage. 
 
 
 
To view the “saw-tooth” pattern and a locally minimized House size 
option for the current 2010 Census data, Figure 2 graphs the Maximum 
Deviation Percentage for all House sizes from 400 to 450 seats.  This range 
of seats demonstrates the clear “saw-tooth” pattern from 400 to 439 seats.  
The dashed vertical on the left represents the reapportionment, based on 
the 2010 Census, of 435 seats for the 113th Congress.  Decreasing the size 
of the House from 435 seats to 419 seats could actually marginally reduce 
the Maximum Deviation Percentage from 65.67% (435 seats) to 63.26%  
(419 seats)and thus, marginally decrease interstate malapportionment.  
An additional one-seat reduction to 418, though, would spike the 
 1152 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:1125 
Maximum Deviation Percentage back up to 65.83%.  Conversely, 
increasing the size of the House from 435 seats to 439 seats would actually 
marginally increase the Maximum Deviation Percentage from 65.67% to 
66.28%and thus, marginally increase interstate malapportionment.  
Adding just one more additional seat, to a House of 440 seats (the dashed 
line on the right), provides Montanathe most under-represented 
statewith its second seat.  As such, there is marked decrease to 57.45% 
in the Maximum Deviation Percentage, and thus a marked decrease in 
interstate malapportionment.  The “saw-tooth” pattern begins again after 
the 440th seat is added.  
Figure 2 suggests that for the 2010 reapportionment, interstate 
malapportionment could be marginally decreased if the House size were 
actually decreased.  But there is also a much lower localized minimum in 
interstate malapportionment within just 5 additional seats of the current 
apportionment of 435 seats.  This 12.5% decrease in the level of the 
Maximum Deviation Percentage with a 440 seat House is similar to the one 
found with the 2000 apportionment populations, though it occurs one seat 
sooner because of the particular variations in state population found in the 
2010 Census.  But, it again demonstrates that even a small adjustment 
(subtractions or additions) to the size of the House can result in an 
improvement in interstate malapportionment.  
 
 
 
This begs the question of how a House of 434 seats or 440 seats, either 
of which better approximates the constitutional principle and democratic 
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norm of “one-person, one-vote,” could violate the practicability standard 
set by Wesberry. 
Figure 3 provides the same data as Figure 2 but with a range of House 
sizes after the 2010 Census from 400 seats to 2000 seatsan upper limit 
that is still constitutional but beyond which is probably impracticable.  
Figure 3 demonstrates that the localized minimum at the 440th seat (the far 
left vertical dashed line) is just that: localized.  After the 440th seat, the 
“saw-tooth” pattern continues until the largest drop in the series occurs 
once the 772nd seat is added.  With the addition of the 772nd, the 
Maximum Deviation Percentage falls from 63.12% to 42.81%.  But, by 
adding thirteen additional seats, there is a localized minimum at 785 seats.  
At this point, the Maximum Deviation Percentage dips to 42.22%.  During 
this series of seat adjustments, the Absolute Total Deviation Percentage is 
also falling, but not as dramatically as the changes in the Maximum 
Deviation Percentage.  The Absolute Total Deviation Percentage reaches a 
localized minimum at the 772nd seat, falling from 4.97% to 4.72%, and 
with the addition of the 785th seat, it falls from 4.82% to 4.79%.  Both of 
these measures continue to fallthough, in its own “saw-tooth” 
patternrelatively quickly as more seats are added until the 926th seat (the 
middle vertical dashed line).  At this House size, the Maximum Deviation 
Percentage is just 27.89% and the Absolute Total Deviation Percentage is 
just 2.87%.  After this seat addition, the pattern persists, but is more stable.  
The lowest Maximum Deviation Percentage (16.71%) within this series 
occurs with a House of 1,921 seats (the far right vertical dashed line).  The 
lowest Absolute Total Deviation Percentage is 1.56% at 1,800 seats.  
In sum, the statute requirement that freezes the House of 
Representatives at 435 seats considerably limits the chamber from 
minimizing interstate malapportionment as measured by either the 
Absolute Total Deviation Percentage or the Maximum Deviation 
Percentage.  Even slightly smaller or larger House size would improve the 
malapportionment statistics most frequently cited by the Supreme Court.   
Thus, the statutory requirement also undermines the constitutional 
requirementas well as the norm of democratic representationof “one 
person, one vote.”  Because of the other constitutional requirements of 
congressional apportionment, no apportionment size can perfectly bring 
the House in line with “one person, one vote.”  But, given recent trends in 
the distributions of state populations, the House is likely to only witness 
increasing levels of interstate malapportionment, and thereby continue to 
move further and further away from this constitutional and democratic 
benchmark.  Only by enlarging the size of the House can all of the 
malapportionment measures in 2010 and into the future be constitutionally 
and considerably lowered.  
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V.  CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
Legislative malapportionment has been a serious issue for the public, 
the courts, and legislative chambers.  The Supreme Court took especially 
bold steps in the 1960s and 1970s to alleviate the problem of intrastate 
malapportionment.154  But, the issue of interstate malapportionment 
remainsand, in many ways, it is much more severe today than intrastate 
malapportionment was under many of the apportionment plans deemed 
unconstitutional by the Court under the constitutional standard of “one 
person, one vote.”  Yet, it has not been addressed.  
This is not to say that interstate malapportionment must be as small as 
intrastate malapportionment.  For example, the Court held in Wells v. 
Rockefeller that the goal to apportion along the boundaries of whole 
counties in upstate New York did not justify the resulting intrastate 
malapportionments;155 but, the drawing of boundaries of whole states is a 
constitutional requirement.  In addition, in the cases concerning state 
legislatures, such as Reynolds v. Sims,156 the Court has held that more 
discretion is warranted because, in part, “there is a significantly larger 
number of seats in state legislative bodies to be distributed within a State 
than congressional seats”157—just as there are more House districts across 
the nation than in any one state.  These caveats cannot be perfectly 
translated to interstate malapportionment in the House, but they seem to be 
reasonable guideposts that would allow for somewhat greater allowances 
in interstate malapportionment than in intrastate malapportionment.  
This is particularly relevant because, given the first three constitutional 
requirements that dictate the apportionment of House seats, there is no 
perfect solution to the problem of interstate malapportionment.  
Nonetheless, if the fourth constitutional requirement, “[r]epresentatives 
shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective 
numbers,”158 is to be taken seriously across institutionsas the Court has 
argued it should—then the public, representatives, and the Court should, at 
the very least, have a discussion about the current size of the House.  And, 
if it were deemed “practicable” to meet one of the core democratic 
standards of voting, which is “of the most fundamental significance under 
our constitutional structure”159 in the United States, the size of the House 
should be increased.  
Increasing the size of the House would also be consistent with the 
                                                                                                                          
154 See discussion supra Part III. 
155 See Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542, 546 (1969) (“To accept a scheme such as New York’s 
would permit groups of districts with defined interest orientations to be overrepresented at the expense 
of districts with different interest orientations.”).  
156 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
157  Id. at 578.  
158 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. 
159  Ill. State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Worker Party, 440 U.S. 173, 184 (1979). 
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expectation of most of the Founders.  Many of them expected that the size 
of the House would increasethough, typically, at some lesser ratewith 
increases in the U.S. population.  This premise is embedded in no more 
important place than the “Great Compromise” itself.160  It would also be 
consistent with the actions of the U.S. Congress for the first 120 years of 
the republic, when the size of the House changed after each of the first 
twelve censuses.161  This stalled in 1920 largely due to political and 
partisan interests, which hardly seem like reasonable justifications to limit 
the progress towards greater individual equality.   
As mentioned, the Court has never ruled directly on the issue of 
interstate malapportionment and the size of the House, though it did 
recently have the opportunity to do so.  In 2010, voters from Mississippi, 
Delaware, Montana, South Dakota, and Utah filed a complaint, Clemons v. 
U.S. Department of Commerce,162 in the Northern District of 
Mississippi.163  The complaint was primarily based on arguments that I had 
previously published164 and have made here.  The Department of 
Commerce countered that the House is held only by the first three 
constitutional requirements and not at all by the fourth.165  Given these 
three constitutional requirements, the Department argued that Congress 
had the discretion to set its own size.166  This surprising argument would 
mean that if Congress decided to provide the House with just fifty 
memberseach state receiving its one constitutionally required member—
the government would deem that as constitutional.  
The District Court agreed that the constitutional requirement first set 
forth in Wesberry v. Sanders167 had “some force” in the case of interstate 
malapportionment168using the same phrase as in U.S. Department of 
Commerce v. Montana.169  The District Court also agreed that Congress 
had discretion to set its own size.170  Without providing much additional 
justification, the District Court held that Congress must have balanced the 
                                                                                                                          
160 See supra notes 92–96 and accompanying text.  
161 See supra notes 131–34 and accompanying text. 
162  710 F. Supp. 2d 570 (2010), vacated, 131 S. Ct. 821 (2010).  
163  I was an expert witness on the case, and parts of this Article are based on briefs submitted for 
the case.  Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum in Support of the Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 
1–7, Clemons v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, No. 3:09-CV-00104-WAP-MPM (N.D. Miss. May 13, 
2010); see also Affidavit of Jeffrey Ladewig at 3–4, Clemons v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, No. 3:09-
CV-00104-WAP-SAA (N.D. Miss. Feb. 19, 2010) (discussing the author’s experience with interstate 
apportionment calculations, as well as the concepts of overrepresentation and underrepresentation).  
164 See Ladewig & Jasinski, supra note 98, at 89–90 (describing interstate malapportionment and 
the lack of discussion on the issue). 
165 Clemons, 710 F. Supp. 2d at 574–75. 
166 See id. at 571–75 (discussing the arguments of the plaintiff voters and the defendant, the U.S. 
Department of Commerce). 
167 Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964). 
168 Clemons, 710 F. Supp. 2d at 588–89 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
169 503 U.S. 442, 461 (1992). 
170 Clemons, 710 F. Supp. 2d at 574. 
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competing interests in choosing 435 seats for the U.S. House of 
Representatives, and thus ruled against the plaintiffs.171  The case was 
appealed to the Supreme Court, and, on December 13, 2010, the Court 
vacated and remanded the District Court’s ruling for lack of jurisdiction.172   
As such, it is still unclear if and how the fourth constitutional 
requirement for the apportionment of the U.S. House of Representatives 
applies to interstate malapportionment.  How could “one person, one vote” 
apply to the apportionment of House seats within states, but not the 
apportionment of House seats among states?  Is the current level of, say, 
the Maximum Deviation Percentage at 65.67% constitutional?  If not, what 
level would be?  Is the Apportionment Act of 1941 that freezes the size of 
the House constitutional?173  Is it constitutional that the Supreme Court 
holds states to a higher standard—in terms of the malapportionment 
statistics as well as the arguments that were rejected, for example, in Wells, 
but that have federal analogues—than it holds the federal institutions?  
This Article attempts to take steps towards answering these questions.  
In particular, interstate malapportionment should be viewed as normatively 
no different than intrastate malapportionment.  There are some practical 
differences, but they do not risein the view of this authorto the level of 
holding a partisan-based statute superior to a fundamental and 
constitutional principle of democratic representation.  At this point, 
perhaps the next step in answering these questions is a more direct and 
open debate on these issues among the public, representatives, and the 
Court.  The premise of the Great Compromise and the constitutional 
requirements of “equal representation” and “one person, one vote” demand 
nothing less.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                          
171 Id. at 590. 
172 Clemons v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 131 S. Ct. 821 (2010). 
173 Apportionment Act of 1941, ch. 470, §§ 1–2(a), 55 Stat. 761, 761–62 (codified as amended at 
2 U.S.C. § 2a (2006)). 
